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Abstract—In recent years, cloud storage technology has been
widely used in many fields such as education, business, medical
and more because of its convenience and low cost. With the
widespread applications of cloud storage technology, data access
control methods become more and more important in cloud-
based network. The ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) scheme is very suitable for access control of data
in cloud storage. However, in many practical scenarios, all
attributes of a user cannot be managed by one authority, so
many multi-authority CP-ABE schemes have emerged. Moreover,
cloud servers are usually semi-trusted, which may leak user
information. Aiming at the above problems, we propose a fine-
grained access control scheme with versatility for cloud storage
based on multi-authority CP-ABE, named vFAC. The proposed
vFAC has the features of large universe, no key escrow problem,
online/offline mechanism, hidden policy, verifiability and user
revocation. Finally, we demonstrate vFAC is static security under
the random oracle model. Through the comparison of several
existing schemes in terms of features, computational overhead
and storage cost, we can draw a conclusion that vFAC is more
comprehensive and scalable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is an emerging network storage technology
with the features of convenience and low cost. Recently,
more and more users are willing to store personal data in
cloud servers, in which some sensitive information might be
involved [1]. Therefore, data access control in cloud storage
has become critical challenge. Produced by Sahai and Waters
[2] in 2005, attribute based encryption (ABE) scheme can
effectively solve the data security and access control issues
simultaneously. This allows users to encrypt and decrypt data
based on different attributes. Following the original work, in
order to provide a more complicated access control policy, CP-
ABE appeared successfully. In CP-ABE, the access policy is
devised by the data owner, and it is especially suitable for
the designing of access control in cloud storage systems, as
shown in Fig. 1.
With the fast development of cloud storage technology,
the CP-ABE schemes with a single central authority are no
longer suitable for some scenarios, because all attributes of
a user are not always managed by one authority. To solve
this problem, Muller et al. [3] proposed a multi-authority
CP-ABE system firstly in 2009, in which different attribute
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Fig. 1: A simple architecture of data access control in cloud
storage
sets are managed by multiple authorities. Their scheme has
distributed requirements by removing central authority with
each attribute authority having equal status. However, most of
similar schemes have the disadvantage of low efficiency. So re-
searchers introduced online/offline mechanism and computing
outsourcing technique to improve the efficiency of CP-ABE.
In 2008, Guo et al. [4] came up with an idea of identity based
online/offline encryption, in which the encryption stage was
split in an online phase, where only several simple operations
are involved to generate the final ciphertext, and an offline
phase. Since then, some schemes [5]–[11] were proposed that
effectively reduced the computation burden of users.
Furthermore, the access policy associated with ciphertext
may reveal some user sensitive information. In 2007, Kapadia
et al. [12] protected users’ privacy with hidden policy, but
there were security flaws. In the next year, Nishide et al.
[13] proposed two CP-ABE constructions to achieve hidden
policy, but only partial policy was hidden. In [14], a security-
enhanced ABE algorithm of hidden policy was proposed in
the composite order group, which proved to be completely
safe under the bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption. However,
the operation efficiency of bilinear pair in composite order
group is lower than that of prime order group. Later, Lewko
and Waters [15] studied the security of ABE schemes in the
prime order group.
Recently, there has been a lot of research on hidden
policy, computational outsourcing, attribute revocation and
traitor tracing according to different functional extensions. In
2015, Rouselakis et al. [16] introduced a multi-authority ABE
scheme supporting large universe, which meant that any string,
as a new attribute, could be added to the system. Moreover,
the number of attributes is not relevant to the public system
parameters any more. In 2017, Zhang Kai et al. [17] solved the
key escrow problem using the separate cloud server and user’s
private keys. At present, the latest revocation mechanisms for
multi-authority ABE [18]–[23] have been more flexible and
can satisfy forward security, but they do not meet the feature
of large universe.
In this paper, we propose a fine-grained access control
scheme with versatility for cloud storage. It provides more
features of online/offline mechanism, hidden policy, and ver-
ifiability than the existing schemes [16], [17]. The proposed
vFAC is proved to satisfy static security under the random
oracle model. In addition, through performance analyses,
vFAC is more comprehensive and scalable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews the related preliminaries and gives a formal defini-
tion. Section III describes the specific process of vFAC in
detail. Then, section IV analyzes the security and performance
through the comparison with other schemes. Finally, section
V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. q-Decisional Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent 2
(q-DPBDHE2) Assumption
It is a deformation based on the q-DPBDHE assumption.
We assume that p is a prime number, G and GT are mul-
tiplicative cyclic groups of order p, g is a generator of G,
and e : G × G → GT is a bilinear map. The follow-
ing process describes the q-DPBDHE2 assumption in detail.
D = (p, g,G, e, gs, {ga
i
}i∈[2q],i6=q+1, {g
bjai}(i,j)∈[2q,q],i6=q+1,
{g
s
bi }i∈[q], {g
saibj
b
j′ }(i,j,j′)∈[q+1,q,q],j 6=j′)
where a, s, b1, · · · , bq ∈ Z∗p are unknown, distinguish-
ing R from e(g, g)sa
q+1
and GT . Assuming that an at-
tacker A can successfully solve the q-DPBDHE2 problem
with the probability at least ε in polynomial time, that is∣
∣
∣Pr[A(D, e(g, g)sa
q+1
) = 0]− Pr[A(D,R) = 0]
∣
∣
∣ ≥ ε.
It can be claimed that the advantage of solving q-DPBDHE2
problem is ε.
B. Formal Definition
Let U represent attribute space, and each attribute authority
AAi(i ∈ [1, n]) manages its own attribute domain Ui ∈ U .
For ∀k, l ∈ [1, n], k 6= l , then Uk ∩ Ul = ∅. This scheme
contains eight formal algorithms.
GlobalSetup(λ) → GP : The GlobalSetup algorithm in-
puts the security parameter λ and outputs global parameters
GP .
AuthoritySetup(GP, i) → 〈PKi, SKi〉: This algorithm
only inputs GP and attribute authority i, and generates its
public/secret key pair 〈PKi, SKi〉.
KeyGen(GP,GID, {SKi} , S) → 〈UPKGID, CSKGID,S ,
USKGID〉: The KeyGen algorithm inputs GP , user’s GID,
secret key {SKi} of the relevant attribute authorities and a
set of the user’s attributes S. It outputs user’s public key
UPKGID, the private key CSKGID,S of the corresponding
cloud server and user’s secret key USKGID.
Offline.Enc(GP, {PKi}) → IC: The Offline.Enc algo-
rithm inputs GP and outputs intermediate ciphertext IC.
Online.Enc(GP, {PKi} ,M, IC,A) → CT : This algo-
rithm inputs GP , message M , intermediate ciphertext IC,
access policy A and public key {PKi} of the relevant attribute
authorities. It outputs ciphertext CT .
CS.Dec(GP,CSKGID,S , UPKGID, CT ) → CTGID or
⊥: The CS.Dec algorithm inputs GP , secret key CSKGID,S
of cloud server, public key UPKGID of the user, and ci-
phertext CT . Then, it outputs partial decrypted ciphertext
CTGID or a symbol ⊥ which represents ciphertext cannot
be decrypted successfully.
User.Dec(USKGID, CTGID) → M or ⊥: The User.Dec
algorithm inputs user’s public key USKGID and partial
decrypted ciphertext CTGID. It outputs the recovered message
M or ⊥.
Revoke(GID,KT ) → KT/{GID,CSKGID}: This al-
gorithm inputs a user’s GID and a key list KT , and outputs
the key list KT after revocation.
III. FINE-GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL WITH
VERSATILITY FOR CLOUD STORAGE
A. System Model
In Fig.2, we can see that the system contains four par-
ticipants: Attribute Authority (AA), Cloud Server (CS), Data
Owner (DO), and Data User (DU).
AA: It is in charge of managing the DU’s attribute set,
and generating the corresponding CS’s private key for these
attributes.
CS: It stores encrypted data and manages the CS’s private
keys corresponding to users.
DO: DO encrypts data based on the access policy, then
uploads the encrypted data to CS.
DU: DU can request data from CS. If the attributes of DU
satisfy the access structure, CS will return the corresponding
partial decrypted ciphertext, then DU restores the cipher with
his/her own private key.
B. Security Model
First, we define a static security model which requires
query-response phase to be completed before the challenge
phase. During the query phase, an attacker A can query
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Fig. 2: System model
the private key of DU and CS, and control some attribute
authorities. The specific description is as follows:
Setup: A challenger C generates GP by GlobalSetup
algorithm and sends it to A.
Query-response Phase: Assume Uθ is the set of attribute
authorities, Cθ is the set of partial attribute authorities con-
trolled by A, and Nθ is the set of other attribute authorities
that are not controlled by A .
• A submits an uncontrolled attribute authority θ ∈ Nθ,
then C runs the AuthoritySetup algorithm and returns
the public key PKθ of θ.
• A submits the DU’s global identifier GIDi, then C
executes the KeyGen algorithm and returns the DU’s
public and private key pair 〈PKi, SKi〉.
• A submits the DU’s global identifier GIDi and the cor-
responding attribute set Si, then C executes the KeyGen
algorithm and returns the private key CSKGIDi,Si of the
CS.
Challenge: A submits the challenge access structure
(A∗, ρ∗) and the challenge ciphertext M∗0 , M
∗
1 . C ran-
domly selects b ∈ {0, 1}, and executes Offline.Enc and
Online.Enc algorithms in turns and returns the challenge
ciphertext CT ∗. Note that for any user GIDi who has queried
for a private key, the attribute set SCθ ∪ Si cannot satisfy the
challenge access structure (A∗, ρ∗).
Guess: A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The attacker’s winning advantage can be defined as∣∣Pr [b = b′]− 12
∣∣.
C. Our Scheme
Based on the system model and formal definition, vFAC is
described as follows.
1) System Initialization
GlobalSetup: In this algorithm, a bilinear map e : G ×
G → GT is chosen firstly, where the orders of G and
GT are both large prime number p, and g is a gener-
ator of G. Next, select a symmetric algorithm SE =
(SE.Enc, SE.Dec, lSE), where SE.Enc is the encryption
algorithm, SE.Dec is the decryption algorithm, and lSE
represents the length of the secret key. Then, choose five
strong collision-resistant hash functions: H : Z∗P → G,
F : U → G, h : GT → {0, 1}
lSE , H1 : GT → {0, 1}
lH1 ,
H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}lH2 . Finally, publish global parameters
GP : GP = 〈λ, e,G,GT , p, g, U, {Ui}, H, F, h,H1, H2, SE〉.
AuthoritySetup: Each attribute authority i ∈ [1, n] ran-
domly selects αi, βi, yi ∈ Z∗p , then sets its own secret
key as SKi = 〈αi, βi, yi〉 and public key as PKi =
〈e(g, g)αi , gβi , gyi〉.
2) Key Generation
KeyGen: The user GID chooses a random num-
ber xGID ∈ Z∗p , then sets his/her public key as
UPKGID = 〈g
xGID , H(GID)xGID 〉. For each attribute
j ∈ S, if it is managed by the attribute authority i, i
needs to choose tj ∈ Z∗p randomly, calculate K
1
j,GID =
gxGIDαiH(GID)xGIDyiF (j)tj , K2j,GID = g
tj , K3j,GID =
F (j)βi , and set the CS’s private key corresponding to the
GID as CSKGID,S = {K1j,GID,K
2
j,GID}j∈S . Then, the
attribute authority i adds 〈GID,CSKGID,S〉 to the key list
KT and sends
{
K3j,GID
}
j∈S to the user GID through a
secure channel.
On receiving the
{
K3j,GID
}
j∈S , the user GID sets his/her
secret key as USKGID = {x
−1
GID, {K
3
j,GID}j∈S}.
3) Offline/Online Data Encryption
Offline.Enc: For each attribute j ∈ [1, U ], DO randomly
selects λj
′, rj , wj ′ ∈ Z∗p , precomputes the ciphertext C1,j =
e(g, g)λj
′
e(g, g)αδ(j)rj , C2,j = g
−rj , C3,j = gyδ(j)rjgwj
′
,
C4,j = F (j)
rj , and outputs the intermediate ciphertext:
IC = {λj
′, wj ′, C1,j , C2,j , C3,j , C4,j}j∈[1,U ].
Online.Enc: Suppose that DO’s attribute domain for cre-
ating access policy is D. In this phase, DO randomly selects
a ∈ Z∗p , calculates σj = e((g
βδ(j))a, F (j)) for each attribute
j ∈ D, and replaces j with H1(σj), where δ(j) represents the
authority who manages the attribute j. DO uses the replaced
attributes to generate the access policy (A, ρ), where A is a
l× n matrix and ρ is a map from the row of matrix A to D.
Then, DO generates the ciphertext by doing the following:
• Randomly select s, y2, · · · , yn, z2, · · · , zn ∈ Z∗p
and build vectors ~v = (s, y2, · · · , yn)T , ~w =
(0, z2, · · · , zn)T .
• Compute λj = ~Aj · ~v, wj = ~Aj · ~w, where ~Aj represents
the row vector in the matrix A that corresponds to j.
• Randomly select M,R ∈ GT , and compute h = ga,
C0 = Re(g, g)
s, C5,j = λj − λj
′, C6,j = wj − wj ′,
KSE = h(R), CSE = SE.Enc(KSE ,M), Tag =
H1(R), V KM = H2(Tag ‖ CSE).
Finally, the ciphertext CT is uploaded to the CS.
CT = 〈(A,ρ), C0, h, CSE, V KM , {C1,j , C2,j , C3,j , C4,j , C5,j ,
C6,j}j∈D〉.
4) Data Decryption
CS.Dec: When DU requests the CS to decrypt the
ciphertext CT , s/he first downloads h securely from CT , then
computes σj = e(h,K
3
j,GID) for each attribute j and replaces
j with H1(σj). If H1(σj) satisfies the access structure (A, ρ),
the CS must be able to find a set of constants {cj ∈ Zp}
to make it satisfy
∑
j∈I⊆{1,2,···l}
cj ~Aj = (1, 0, · · · , 0). Next, the
CS calculates C1,GID =
∏
j∈I
(C1,je(g, g)
C5,j )
cj
, C2,GID =
∏
j∈I
(e(K1j,GID, C2,j)e(H(GID)
xGID , C3,jg
C6,j )e(K2j,GID, C4,j))
cj
and returns the partial decrypted ciphertext
CTGID = 〈C0, C1,GID, C2,GID, V KM , CSE〉. Otherwise,
CS returns ⊥ to DU if H1(σj) does not satisfy the access
structure (A, ρ).
User.Dec: Upon receiving CTGID, DU calculates
C1,GIDC2,GID
x
−1
GID = e(g, g)s, R = C0
e(g,g)s , Tag = H1(R).
Then, DO verifies if the equation H2(Tag ‖ CSE) = V KM
holds. If it does, DU continues to calculate KSE = h(R),
M = SE.Dec(KSE , CSE), and returns M . Otherwise, it
returns ⊥.
5) User Revocation
Revoke: To revoke the user GID, the CS can find the
corresponding entry from the key list and delete it.
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
A. Correctness Analysis
If a DU’s attributes satisfy the access structure, the equa-
tions
∑
j∈I
λjcj = s and
∑
j∈I
wjcj = 0 will hold. Then, we can
have the following formulas:
σj = e((g
βδ(j))a, F (j)) = e(ga, F (j)
βδ(j)
) = e(h,K3j,GID)
(1)
C1,je(g, g)
C5,j = e(g, g)λj
′
e(g, g)αδ(j)rje(g, g)λj−λj
′
= e(g, g)λje(g, g)αδ(j)rj
(2)
C3,jg
C6,j = gyδ(j)rjgwj
′
gwj−wj
′
= gyδ(j)rjgwj (3)
C1,GIDC2,GID
x
−1
GID
=
∏
j∈I
(C1,je(g, g)
C5,j )
cj ∏
j∈I
(e(K1j,GID, C2,j)·
e(H(GID)xGID , C3,jg
C6,j )e(K2j,GID, C4,j))
cj
xGID
=
∏
j∈I
{e(g, g)λje(g, g)αδ(j)rj ·
e(g
xGIDαδ(j)
H(GID)xGIDyδ(j)F (j)tj , g−rj )
1
xGID ·
e(H(GID)xGID , gyδ(j)rjgwj )
1
xGID
e(gtj , F (j)
rj
)
1
xGID }cj
=
∏
j∈I
{e(g, g)λje(H(GID), g)wje(gαδ(j) , g−rj )·
e(H(GID)
yδ(j)
, g−rj )e(F (j)
tj
xGID , g−rj )e(g
tj
xGID , F (j)rj )·
e(H(GID), gyδ(j)rj )e(g, g)
αδ(j)rj
}cj
=
∏
j∈I
{e(g, g)λje(H(GID), g)wj}cj
= e(g, g)
∑
j∈I
λjcj
e(H(GID), g)
∑
j∈I
wjcj
= e(g, g)s
(4)
If we can restore e(g, g)s, the plaintextM will be decrypted
correctly.
B. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the security properties of the
vFAC in the following respects.
1) Static Security: Here, we analyze the security of vFAC
based on security model in Section III.
Lemma 1. If the scheme in [16], named RW, satisfies the
static security under the random oracle model, vFAC can also
satisfy the static security.
Proof. Assume that, under the static security model, an at-
tacker A can break vFAC in polynomial time by the advantage
ε. So, there must be a simulator B can break RW with the
same advantage. The following specifically describes how a
simulator B breaks RW with the help of A and the challenger
C of RW.
Setup. C executes GlobalSetup algorithm in RW and
sends GP to B. According to the GlobalSetup algorithm of
vFAC, B generates the global parameters GP and sends it to
A.
Query-response Phase. In this phase, we assume that the
set of attribute authorities is Uθ, the set of corrupted authorities
controlled by A is Cθ , and the set of uncontrolled authorities
is Nθ, besides, Nθ ∪Cθ = Uθ, Nθ ∩Cθ = ∅. For a corrupted
attribute authority θ ∈ Cθ , A first generates the corresponding
public key {PKθ}θ∈Cθ of θ and sends it to B. Then, B sends
{PKθ}θ∈Cθ to C. Next, A does the following queries to B,
and B gives the corresponding responses.
• A submits an uncontrolled attribute authority θ ∈ Nθ ,
then B asks C for the corresponding public key of θ. C ex-
ecutes the AuthoritySetup algorithm of RW, generates
the corresponding public key PKθ = 〈e(g, g)αθ , gyθ〉,
and sends it to B. Then B updates the public key
to PKθ = 〈e(g, g)
αθ , gβθ , gyθ〉 and sends PKθ to A
according to the AuthoritySetup algorithm of vFAC.
• A submits a user’s identifier GIDi(1 ≤ i ≤ m) to B,
then B executes the KeyGen algorithm to generate the
corresponding private key USKGIDi = x
−1
GIDi
, public
key UPKGIDi = 〈g
xGIDi , H(GIDi)
xGIDi 〉, and sends
〈USKGIDi, UPKGIDi〉 to A.
• A submits a user’s identifier GIDi and the user’s
attribute set Si (1 ≤ i ≤ n,m < n) to B, then B re-
turns the corresponding CS’s private key and user’s
private key to A. If 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then for each
j ∈ Si, B chooses tj ∈ Z∗p randomly, and com-
putes K1j,GIDi = g
xGIDi
αθH(GIDi)
xGIDi
yθF (j)tjxGIDi ,
K2j,GIDi = g
tjxGIDi , K3j,GIDi = F (j)
βθ ; If m < i ≤ n,
then B chooses gj ∈ G, tj ∈ Z∗p randomly, and computes
K1j,GIDi = gjF (j)
tj , K2j,GIDi = g
tj , K3j,GIDi = F (j)
βθ .
Finally, B sends A the corresponding private keys of CS
and user.
Challenge. A submits the challenge access structure
(A∗, ρ∗), challenge plaintext M∗0 , M
∗
1 to B. B randomly
selects b ∈ {0, 1}, executes Offline.Enc and Online.Enc
algorithms, and returns the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ to A.
Note that for all users who have queried the private key, and
TABLE I: Comparison of Features
Schemes Prime order group No CA Large universe No key escrow problem Online/Offline Hidden policy Verifiability Revocation
RW [16]
√ √ √ × × × × ×
MZL [17]
√ √ √ √ × × × √
YMCZZ [18] × √ × √ × × × ×
LLL [20]
√ √ × √ √ √ √ √
NMSM [22]
√ × × √ × × × √
vFAC
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
the attribute set SCθ ∪ Si cannot satisfy the challenge access
structure (A∗, ρ∗).
Guess. A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}, B also outputs b′.
In the above game, B perfectly simulates the challenger
of vFAC under real conditions, and the CS’s private key
generated by B matches the user’s private key generated by
the KeyGen algorithm of RW. In addition, B can determine
the selected R in the Online.Enc algorithm of vFAC from
the b′.
R is equivalent to the messageM that needs to be encrypted
in the Encrypt algorithm of RW. Therefore, if the attacker A
can break vFAC with the advantage ε in polynomial time, B
can also break RW, which contradicts with the premise that
RW satisfies static security.
Lemma 2. If the q-DPBDHE2 assumption holds, RW satisfies
the static security under the random oracle model.
Proof. Lemma 2 has been proven in [16].
Theorem 1. Our proposed vFAC satisfies the static security
under the random oracle model.
Proof. According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, Theorem 1
can be proven.
2) Hidden Policy: In the online.Enc phase, DO replaces
all attributes of D with H1(σj), and only the user GIDi
with the corresponding key K3j,GIDi can recover σj for each
attribute j ∈ D. The access policy of the ciphertext stored
on the CS does not provide any useful information about
user attributes, so privacy protection for user attributes can
be achieved.
3) No Key Escrow Problem: DU’s public key UPKGIDi
is used as a generating parameter when AA generates the
corresponding private key of CS for the userGIDi. Therefore,
whether AA or CS can only partially decrypt the ciphertext,
and only the user can restore the corresponding plaintext with
his/her private key x−1GIDi . If AA and CS attempt to decrypt
partial ciphertext, they will have to solve the discrete logarithm
problem.
4) Verifiability: Our vFAC encrypts a random key R using
access policy, while the real message M is hidden by sym-
metric algorithm SE and symmetric key KSE . Therefore, the
verification of V KM ensures the correctness of the random
key R, which is to ensure the correctness of the ciphertext
decrypted by the CS.
C. Performance Analyses
1) Comparison of Features: Table I shows the comparison
on features among the selected schemes. YMCZZ in [18]
is accountable, but its method of solving the key escrow
problem will cause the waste of resources, which is difficult
to implement under actual conditions. Besides, the schemes in
[18], [20], [22] may have the problem of system construction
if too many attributes are added to attribute authorities due to
lack in the feature of large universe. Because our proposed
vFAC provides all the features listed in table I, it is more
comprehensive than other schemes.
2) Comparison of Computation Overhead: We make a
comparison on the phases of offline/online encryption and
user decryption between vFAC and the selected schemes in
TABLE II. Let l denote the number of rows of the access
matrix, |I| (|I| ≤ l) denote the number of rows used for de-
cryption in the access matrix, P denote bilinear pair operation,
and E denote exponential operation.
TABLE II: Comparison of Computation Overhead
Schemes
Encryption
Decryption.user
Offline.Enc Online.Enc
RW [16] (4l + 1)E 3 |I|P + 2 |I|E
MZL [17] (4l + 1)E E
YMCZZ [18] (4l + 1)E 3 |I|P + 2 |I|E
LLL [20] 3lE 2E E
NMSM [22] (l+ 2)E (|I|+ 1)P + (|I|+ 1)E
vFAC 4lE 2E E
In TABLE II, we found that the schemes in [16]–[18],
[22] have no offline encryption mechanism, which cause the
number of operations in encryption phase linearly increasing
with l. In [16], [18], [22], the user directly decrypts the
original ciphertext, so the exponential operations and the
number of bilinear pair operations also linearly increase with
|I| in the decryption phase, leading to high computational
complexity. In the decryption process of vFAC, only one
exponent operation is involved. Although, in [20], the user
also only needs one decryption operation, it is achieved
by outsourcing decryption and cannot solve the key escrow
problem. For all the above, vFAC has high computational
efficiency on the user side.
3) Comparison of Storage Cost: Denote |Zp| and |G| as the
length of element in Zp and G, |U | as the number of attributes
managed by AA, |S| as the number of user’s attributes, |c| as
the length of the ciphertext after symmetric encryption, and
|V K| as the length of the verification key. The Table III shows
the comparison result of storage cost. The length of ciphertext
TABLE III: Comparison of Storage Cost
Schemes Secret key of AA Public key of AA Private key of user Ciphertext size
RW [16] 2 |Zp| 2 |G| 2 |G| |S| (4l + 1) |G|
MZL [17] 2 |Zp| 2 |G| |Zp| (4l + 1) |G|
YMCZZ [18] 2 |Zp| 2 |G| 2 |G| |S| (4l + 1) |G|
LLL [20] 1 + |U| |Zp| 1 + |U| |G| 2 + |S| |G|+ |Zp| (3l+ 2) |G| + 2l |Zp| + |c|+ |VK|
NMSM [22] (5 |U| + 1) |Zp| (3 |U| + 1) |G| (2 |S| + 1) |G| (l+ 2) |G|
vFAC 3 |Zp| 3 |G| 2 |Zp| (4l+ 2) |G| + 2l |Zp| + |c|+ |VK|
is linearly related to |I| because the ciphertext corresponds to
the access policy. The storage capacity of the CS is actually
stronger than that of users. Therefore, the storage cost of
ciphertext on the CS can be omitted. Here, we mainly focus
on the user’s storage cost.
In [20], [22], the length of the public/private key of each AA
is linearly related to the number of its attributes. Therefore,
the length of public/private key of AA is linearly related to
|U |. The users private key in [16], [18], [20], [22] is directly
generated by AA based on the user’s attributes, so the length
of private key is linearly related to |S|. When the number
of attributes increases, the user’s storage cost increases too.
In vFAC, the length of AA’s public/private key is a fixed
value because it is independent of the number of attributes.
Although the whole storage cost in [18] is lower than vFAC,
it does not meet the property of large universe. In conclusion,
vFAC is more suited for data access control because of its
comprehensive features.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to solve the fine-grained data access control prob-
lem in cloud storage, this paper proposes a fine-grained access
control scheme for cloud storage based on multi-authority
CP-ABE. The proposed vFAC not only realizes online/offline
encryption mechanism, but also satisfy the feature of hidden
policy. Furthermore, vFAC allows the user to verify the
decrypted ciphertext to ensure that the CS decrypts ciphers
correctly. The static security of vFAC is also proved under the
random oracle model. In particular, the analyses of features,
computation overhead, and storage cost with the other existing
schemes show that the vFAC has a more comprehensive
advantage for cloud storage.
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